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Using ‘queer’ is a way of reminding us how we are perceived by the rest of the 
world […] And when spoken to other gays and lesbians it’s a way of suggesting we 
close ranks, and forget (temporarily) our individual differences because we face a 
more insidious common enemy. 
 
 –AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, “Queers Read This” 
 
Recent literature on the metaphysics of sexuality has primarily focused on sexual orientation. Yet, 
there’s another philosophically significant phenomenon in the neighborhood: sexual identity. In 
this chapter, I develop a theory of queer and straight sexual identity. Broadly, I argue that sexual 
identity is a matter of inclusion/exclusion in relation to sexuality cultures.  
 
Here’s the plan. In (§1), I provide some traction on the phenomenon of sexual identity. In (§2) and 
(§3), I critique Orientation-Based as well as Social Position and Conferralist Theories of Sexual 
Identity. Next, in (§4) and (§5), I argue in favor of the Cultural Theory of Sexual Identity. More 
specifically, I argue that the cultural theory of sexual identity is especially conducive to explaining 
LGBTQIA+ oppression and resistance. 
 
1. What is Sexual Identity? 
 
The epigraph quotes an infamous political pamphlet, distributed at NYC Pride in 1990. Among 
many other calls to action, the document argues in favor of reappropriating the term ‘queer’ – 
noting that the “rough word” is “also a sly and ironic weapon we can steal from the homophobe's 
hands and use against him.”1 On my view, the reappropriated term ‘queer’ tracks an element of 
                                                        
* In addition to the editors of this volume, special thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, 
Robin Dembroff, Esa Díaz-León, Carolina Flores, Sally Haslanger, Zachary Irving, José Medina, 
Jennifer Saul, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, and Peter Tan.  
1 AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, “Queers Read This,” available at the Queer Zine Archive 
Project, www.qzap.org. 
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the social world, which I consider under the label ‘queer sexual identity’. Accordingly, queer 
sexual identity is a higher-order category, with lower-order sexual identity categories including 
lesbian, gay, butch, and bear.  
 
Very generally, sexual identity is a social identity. As Ásta explains, a social identity is “a place 
in a system of social relations.”2 For example, consider the social identity of being a sophomore-
level student. An individual is a sophomore-level student in virtue of occupying a certain place in 
a social structure (viz., a college or university) in relation to faculty, administrators, and other 
students.  
 
Notice that as an individual might be mistaken about whether they’re a sophomore-level student, 
say on account of miscounting credit hours. Likewise, it’s also possible for an individual to be 
mistaken about their sexual identity. The issue, indeed, is especially severe in the case of sexual 
identity inasmuch as heteronormative ideology disposes individuals to perceive straight identity 
as normal and natural. For example, while lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals “come out” as 
queer, straight individuals don’t typically “come out” as straight. That difference with respect to 
coming out practices only makes sense in heteronormative ideological contexts in which straight 
identity is represented as standard. Now, on account of heteronormative ideology, many proud 
queer people previously believed that they were straight. Attending to the significance of 
heteronormative ideology, then, provides reason to reject the following theories: 
 
Self-Ascription Theory of Queer Sexual Identity: An individual has a queer sexual identity 
in virtue of sincerely believing that they’re queer, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or asexual.  
 
Self-Ascription Theory of Straight Sexual Identity: An individual has a straight sexual 
identity in virtue of sincerely believing that they’re straight. 
 
Contra the self-ascription theory of queer sexual identity, I hold that an individual is queer (or 
straight) in virtue of occupying a certain place in a social structure. Now, there are lots of social 
                                                        
2 Ásta, Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social 
Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 118. 
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positions related to sexuality. And so, a theory of sexual identity needs to pinpoint the relevant – 
viz., explanatorily significant – social positions related to sexuality. That’s the task of the 
remaining sections.  
 
2. Critique of Orientation-Based Theories of Sexual Identity 
 
It might seem remarkably simple to say what makes it the case that an individual is queer or 
straight; in particular:  
 
Orientation-Based Theory of Queer Sexual Identity: An individual has a queer sexual 
identity in virtue of being non-heterosexual. 
 
Orientation-Based Theory of Straight Sexual Identity: An individual has a straight sexual 
identity in virtue of being heterosexual. 
 
The orientation-based theory of sexual identity, I argue, is mistaken. More specifically, in this 
section, I argue that an individual’s sexual orientation doesn’t ground their sexual identity. At this 
point, I expect that some readers will find unintuitive the very distinction between sexual 
orientation and identity. If that’s you, stay tuned: the following discussion will serve to highlight 
the difference! 
 
2.1 Terminology: ‘Straight’ ≠ ‘Heterosexual’ 
 
There are many legitimate ways to use the term ‘queer’. For example, here’s Maggie Nelson 
reflection on the usage of a foundational figure in the field of queer theory, Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick: “Sedgwick wanted to make way for ‘queer’ to hold all kinds of resistances and 
fracturings and mismatches […] ‘Queer is a continuing moment, movement, motive – recurrent, 
eddying, troublant’ she wrote. ‘Keenly, it is relational, and strange.’ She wanted the term to be a 
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perpetual excitement.”3 I find few things more compelling than that queerness. Yet, the 
aforementioned variety of queerness is not the focus of this chapter.  
 
Instead, in the context of this chapter, I use terms such as ‘queer’, ‘straight’, ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bi’, 
and ‘ace’ to refer to sexual identities. And I use terms such as ‘homosexual’, ‘heterosexual’, 
‘bisexual’, and ‘asexual’ to refer to sexual orientations. This terminological difference, of course, 
doesn’t amount to a metaphysical difference between sexual identity and sexual orientation.4 
Instead, in this chapter, I theorize an element of the social world, which I refer to with the term 
‘queer’.  
 
2.2 Sexual Orientation  
 
An individual has a particular sexual orientation (e.g., homosexual) in virtue of being disposed to 
engage in certain sexual behaviors and/or experience certain sexual desires (especially with respect 
to sex and/or gender).5 As Esa Díaz-Léon explains in this volume, note that sexual orientations are 
grounded in sexual dispositions as opposed to actual sexual desires and/or behaviors.6 Regarding 
the dispositional element of sexual orientation, it’s again important to attend to heteronormative 
ideology. More specifically, as Robin Dembroff explains, “under extreme social pressure,” 
heteronormative ideology compels many homosexual and bisexual individuals, “[to] enter so-
                                                        
3 Maggie Nelson, The Argonauts (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Graywolf Press, 2016), 28-29. 
4 Moreover, I stress that I don’t aim to provide a semantics of the term ‘queer’. For discussion of 
the distinction between the semantics of socially significant terms such as ‘queer’ or ‘woman’ and 
the metaphysics of social properties such as queer or woman, see Elizabeth Barnes, “Gender and 
Gender Terms,” Nous (2019), 8-10. See also Robin Dembroff, “Escaping the Natural Attitude 
About Gender,” Phil Stud (2021), 990-994. 
5 In the context of this chapter, I use terms such as ‘female’, ‘intersex’, and ‘male’ to refer to 
anatomical, hormonal, and/or chromosomal features. And I use terms such as ‘genderqueer’, 
‘woman’, and ‘man’ to refer to features involving self-identity and/or social situatedness. In this 
minimal way, I appeal to the sex/gender distinction. Still, I stress that neither sex nor gender are 
binary. That is, in addition to female and male, sex includes categories such as intersex. Likewise, 
in addition to woman and man, gender includes categories such as non-binary. For an argument in 
favor of appealing to the sex/gender distinction in the context of sexual orientation ascriptions, see 
Robin Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (2016), 9-12. 
6 See Esa Díaz-Léon, “Sexual Orientations, Sexual Desires, and Choice,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of the Philosophy of Sex, eds. Clare Chambers, Brian Earp, and Lori Watson 
(forthcoming). 
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called ‘straight’ relationships and so behaviorally (if not also psychologically) repress their sexual 
desires.”7 Indeed, as Lisa Diamond explains in this volume, complex interactions among various 
factors, ranging from hormones to cultural norms, have the potential to cause changes in patterns 
of sexual behavior and/or desire.8 For example, consider Carson, a man who exclusively sexually 
engages with women. Yet, suppose that Carson exclusively sexually engages with women because 
Carson lives in a society with strict prohibitions against homosexuality, such that Carson would 
exclusively sexually engage with men in a just society. In that case, actual sexual behaviors 
notwithstanding, Carson isn’t heterosexual. Heteronormative ideology can impact sexual behavior, 
such that a dispositional theory of sexual orientation is needed in order correctly to categorize 
behaviorally repressed homosexual individuals as homosexual. And so, in short, sexual 
orientations are grounded in sexual dispositions.   
 
2.3 Sexual Identity Isn’t Grounded in Sexual Orientation 
 
Here, I develop the following argument in favor of the claim that sexual identity isn’t grounded in 
sexual orientation: 
 
(1) If sexual identity were grounded in sexual orientation, then individuals identical with 
respect to sexual orientation couldn’t differ with respect to sexual identity. 
(2) Individuals identical with respect to sexual orientation can differ with respect to sexual 
identity. 
(3) Therefore, sexual identity isn’t grounded in sexual orientation.  
 
Claim (1) is an application of the thesis of grounding necessitation.9 For example, if being straight 
were grounded in being heterosexual, then an individual couldn’t be heterosexual without being 
straight. The controversial claim is (2), which I’ll defend across (§2.3.1) and (§2.3.2). Note that 
                                                        
7 Robin Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (2016), 12. 
8 See the dynamical systems approach to sexual orientation in Lisa M. Diamond, “What is Sexual 
Orientation?,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sex, eds. Clare Chambers, Brian 
Earp, and Lori Watson (forthcoming).  
9 The thesis of grounding necessitation holds that if F grounds G, then F metaphysically 
necessitates G. Readers who reject grounding necessitation can appeal to their preferred modally-
constrained relation in order to interpret (1). 
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the success of either (§2.3.1) or (§2.3.2) is independently sufficient to establish that individuals 
identical with respect to sexual orientation can differ with respect to sexual identity.  
 
2.3.1 Str8 Dudes 
 
Here’s a sociological account of self-described “str8 dudes” from Jane Ward’s widely-cited study:  
 
Str8 dudes often describe sex between dudes as a less desirable, but ‘easy’, alternative to 
sex with women, or suggest that dude-sex is a means of getting the kind of sex that all 
straight men want from women, but can only get from men – uncomplicated, emotionless, 
and guaranteed. Str8 dudes get drunk, watch heterosexual porn […] and maintain a clear 
emotional boundary between each other […] References to being ‘chill bros’ and ‘male 
bonding’ help to reframe dude-sex as a kind of sex that bolsters, rather than threatens, the 
heterosexual masculinity of the participants. Only those who are ‘man enough’ and ‘chill 
enough’ will want dude-sex or be able to handle it.10  
 
Str8 dudes have sexual dispositions towards other men. Accordingly, str8 dudes are non-
heterosexual (viz., homosexual and bisexual).11 The non-heterosexuality of str8 dudes 
notwithstanding, Ward argues that str8 dudes are straight on account of their “disavowal of gay 
identity and culture.”12 Of course, many non-heterosexual individuals are queer. And so, 
individuals identical with respect to sexual orientation can differ with respect to sexual identity.  
 
                                                        
10 Jane Ward, “Dude-Sex: White Masculinities and ‘Authentic’ Heterosexuality Among Dudes 
Who Have Sex with Dudes,” Sexualities (2008), 420-421. 
11 This ascription of non-heterosexuality assumes ordinary dispositionalism about sexual 
orientation. Ordinary dispositionalism holds that an individual’s orientation is grounded in the 
sexual behaviors and/or desires that the individual would manifest in cases in which the individual 
has “a reasonable diversity of potential sexual partners.” See Dembroff, “What is Sexual 
Orientation?,” 17. Ordinary dispositionalism stands in contrast with ideal dispositionalism, which 
holds that an individual’s orientation is grounded in the sexual behaviors and/or desires that the 
individual would manifest in ideal contexts, see Edward Stein, The Mismeasure of Desire: The 
Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 45. 
12 Ward, “Dude-Sex: White Masculinities and ‘Authentic’ Heterosexuality Among Dudes Who 
Have Sex with Dudes,” Sexualities (2008), 415. See also ibid., 414-416 and 428-431. 
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2.3.2 Gay Identity 
 
Gay identity is, well, somewhat new. On this point, John D’Emilio argues: “[G]ay men and 
lesbians have not always existed […] and have come into existence in a specific historical era […] 
that has allowed large numbers of men and women in the late twentieth century to call themselves 
gay, to see themselves as part of a community of similar men and women, and to organize 
politically on the basis of that identity.”13 Embedded here is the idea that gay identity requires 
certain cultural and political elements. More specifically, D’Emilio suggests that gay identity can 
only exist as part of a historically-specific “way of life” that started to form as non-heterosexual 
men began to seek out same-gender sexuality and love in critical mass.14 In that case, it would only 
be possible for homosexual men to have gay identities in recent historical contexts, such that 
individuals identical with respect to sexual orientation can differ with respect to sexual identity.   
 
In the course of this chapter, in detail, I’ll discuss various queer ways of life, viz., distinctively 
valuable constructs that deserve respect and protection alongside non-heterosexual sexual 
orientations. To begin, here’s an example adapted from a recent (very gay) experience.  
 
Mark, a thirty-year-old academic, was riding his bike downtown when he noticed a 
storefront adorned with rainbow flags. Mark jumped off his bike to check out the shop, 
meeting and eventually becoming close friends with the owners of the shop, Keith and 
Robert, who have been married since 2015. Keith is a fifty-year-old sculptor who produces 
much of the artwork sold in the shop, and Robert is a sixty-year-old community organizer 
who manages operations. Mark, Robert, and Keith’s friendship is set against a relief of 
shared experiences. For example, Mark, Robert, and Keith each know what it’s like to 
experience homophobia, lose a friend to HIV/AIDS, come out of the closet, visit a gay club 
for the first time, etc. etc. Regarding the aforementioned relief of shared experiences, 
Robert and Keith are often playfully distraught when Mark confesses to being unfamiliar 
                                                        
13 John D’Emilio, “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, eds. 
Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993), 468. 
14 Ibid., 470. 
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with certain cultural items, e.g., Pricilla Queen of the Desert, such that Robert and Keith 
have taken on the project of introducing Mark to various films in (what they call) the gay 
cannon.15 
 
The crucial point here is that Mark, Robert, and Keith participate in a shared way of life. On this 
point, note that intergenerational friendships can be difficult to sustain in many heteronormative 
milieus on account of an ideological belief that cross-generational relationships are not of value 
“outside their normative and legal framing as family members and recipients of care.”16 Yet, 
similar beliefs are not generally found among individuals who participate in the way of life shared 
among Mark, Robert, Keith, and many other gay men. And that’s the case for an interesting 
practical reason: intergenerational gay friendships build political solidarity as well as distribute 
wellbeing-promoting knowledge in contexts of oppression and stigmatization.17  
 
At this point, note that Mark, Robert, and Keith need not have the same sexual orientation in order 
to participate in the aforementioned way of life. To be clear, sexual orientation isn’t irrelevant to 
sexual identity. For example, if Mark were exclusively attracted to women, then it’s unlikely that 
Mark would have so many shared experiences (e.g., coming out the closet) with Robert and Keith. 
And without a relief of shared experiences, Mark, Robert, and Keith wouldn’t be able to 
meaningfully to participate in the same way of life. This notwithstanding, under some descriptions, 
Mark, Robert, and Keith each have a different sexual orientation. More specifically, Mark, Robert, 
and Keith are (in no particular order) sexually attracted to (i) men, (ii) men and women, and (iii) 
men and nonbinary individuals. These differences with respect to sexual orientation, however, are 
compatible with Mark, Robert, and Keith participating in the same way of life. In short, while 
                                                        
15 Contemporary films in the gay cannon tend to include representations of queer characters, while 
classic films in the gay cannon often include representations of strong female characters 
overcoming adversity that tended to resonate with gay men who were otherwise erased from public 
discourse. For discussion, see David M. Halperin, How to Be Gay (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
16 Catherine Elliott O’Dare, Virpi Timonen, and Catherine Conlon, “Intergenerational Friendships 
of Older Adults: Why Do We Know So Little about Them?,” Ageing and Society (2017), 13. 
17 For further discussion of intergenerational queer friendships, viz., involving chosen family, see 
Matthew Andler, “Sexual Orientation Categories,” Ergo (forthcoming). 
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there’s an important relation between sexual orientation and sexual identity, that relation is not the 
relation of determination.   
 
3. Critique of Conferralist and Hierarchical Social Position Theories of Sexual Identity 
 
Before developing the cultural theory of sexual identity in (§4), it’ll be instructive to consider the 
application of some prominent frameworks in social metaphysics to the phenomenon of sexual 
identity. More specifically, in (§3.1) and (§3.2), I outline the conferralist theory of sexual identity 
as well as the hierarchical social position theory of sexual identity. Then, in (§3.3), I argue against 
the aforementioned theories via an argument regarding the extensions of sexual identity concepts. 
In particular, I argue that neither conferralist nor hierarchical social position theories of sexual 
identity generate the correct result that closeted individuals can be queer.  
 
3.1 Conferralist Theories of Sexual Identity 
 
In the sparse philosophical literature on the topic, sexual identity is often treated as a conferred 
property.18 Now, the conferralist framework is due to Ásta, who provides the following conferralist 
theory of the property being cool.19  
 
Conferred property: being cool 
Who: the people in the context, collectively 
What: their judging the person to have the base property or properties 
When: in a particular context the person travels in, for example, one context can be at 
Mission High School in San Francisco, another the skate park in the Sunset District of San 
Francisco; someone can be cool at Mission High, but not at the skate park 
                                                        
18 See Ásta, Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social 
Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 88-89. In previous work, I’ve outlined 
(without endorsing) a conferralist theory of sexual identity. See Andler, “The Sexual 
Orientation/Identity Distinction,” Hypatia (2021), 264-266. 
19 Ásta, Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social 
Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 22-23. 
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Base property: the property or properties the conferrers are attempting to track in their 
conferral in each contexts; for example, having blue hair may be a base property for being 
cool at Mission High; having a tattoo at the skate park 
 
On the conferralist framework, an individual instantiates the property being cool in virtue of the 
actions of other social agents. More specifically, on the conferralist framework, an individual 
instantiates the property being cool in virtue of other social agents taking the individual to have 
the relevant (context-specific) base property (or properties). For example, at Mission High, an 
individual would be cool in virtue of other social agents taking the individual to have blue hair. 
On Ásta’s account, then, it’s possible that an individual instantiates the property being cool without 
actually having blue hair – perhaps as a result of using a special Instagram filter or temporary (as 
opposed to semi-permanent) hair dye. More generally, in order for an individual to instantiate a 
conferred property, it’s not necessary that they instantiate the correlated base property. Instead, 
what matters is that the individual is taken to have the base property.  
 
Now, in previous work, I’ve applied Ásta’s conferralist framework to the case of queer sexual 
identity. In particular, without ultimately endorsing such an account, I argued that the conferralist 
framework could be applied to the case of sexual identity as follows: “an individual instantiates 
the sexual identity property being queer in virtue of instantiating conferred properties in which the 
base property is being non-heterosexual.”20 To put the point a bit differently:  
 
Conferralist Theory of Queer Sexual Identity: An individual has a queer sexual identity in 
virtue of other social agents (accurately or inaccurately) taking the individual to be non-
heterosexual in contexts in which being taken to be non-heterosexual is social significant.  
 
Conferralist Theory of Straight Sexual Identity: An individual has a straight sexual identity 
in virtue of other social agents (accurately or inaccurately) taking the individual to be 
heterosexual in contexts in which being taken to be heterosexual is social significant.  
 
                                                        
20 Andler, “The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction,” Hypatia (2021), 266. 
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Importantly, on the conferralist theory of sexual identity, an individual need not heterosexual in 
order to be straight. What’s matters is the perception of other social agents.   
 
3.2 Hierarchical Social Position Theories of Sexual Identity 
 
Another especially influential framework in social metaphysics is Sally Haslanger’s hierarchical 
theory of social categories. The application of Sally Haslanger’s hierarchical social position 
framework to the case of sexual identity generates the following result.21   
 
Hierarchical Social Position Theory of Queer Sexual Identity: An individual has a queer 
sexual identity in virtue of other social agents taking the individual to be non-heterosexual 
in ideological contexts in which individuals are subordinated on the basis of being taken to 
be non-heterosexual.  
 
Hierarchical Social Position Theory of Straight Sexual Identity: An individual has a 
straight sexual identity in virtue of other social agents taking the individual to be 
heterosexual in ideological contexts in which individuals are privileged on the basis of 
being taken to be heterosexual.  
 
In order to gain some traction on the hierarchical social position theory of queer sexual identity, 
note that hierarchical social position theories (along with conferralist theories) stand in contrast to 
self-ascription and orientation-based theories in the following way. While self-ascription and 
orientation-based theories hold that having a queer sexual identity is grounded in features internal 
to the individual, hierarchical social position theories (along with conferralist theories) hold that 
having a queer sexual identity is grounded in features external to the individual. Furthermore, in 
contrast to conferralist theories, hierarchical social position theories hold that only external 
features specifically related to oppression and privilege ground an individual’s sexual identity. As 
discussed in (§1), heteronormative ideology is especially harmful to lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
                                                        
21 For the hierarchical social position framework, see Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are 
They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” in Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social 
Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 227-328. 
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individuals. The hierarchical social position theory of sexual identity holds that what it is to have 
a queer sexual identity is systematically to experience that very ideologically-based oppression.   
 
3.3 Critique of Conferralist and Hierarchical Social Position Theories of Sexual Identity 
 
Here, I argue that we ought to reject conferralist and hierarchical social position theories of sexual 
identity; in particular, I argue that the aforementioned theories incorrectly categorize many 
closeted individuals as straight. For example, consider Mary, a high school student living in 
Emerald City. Mary is attracted to genderqueer individuals and women, but she’s closeted on 
account of the severe homophobia in Emerald City. Eventually, Mary will move to Gillikin 
Country, join an indie rock band, and work with an LGBTQIA+ activist organization to resist the 
heteronormative policies of the Wizard. But not yet. Right now, as a closeted high school student, 
Mary is taken to be heterosexual. But Mary isn’t straight. She’s passing as straight. 
 
Perhaps that’s too quick. Why not revise our beliefs about the extension of the sexual identity 
category queer in light of the conferralist or hierarchical social position theories? Indeed, we often 
gain knowledge about categories via observation or analysis. For example, fungi aren’t in the 
extension of the category plant, and Pluto isn’t in the extension of the category planet. Yet, I reject 
such a revisionary strategy in the case of sexual identity. In particular, as I’ll highlight in (§5), the 
concept of queer sexual identity plays a crucial theoretical role in the explanation of LGBTQIA+ 
oppression and resistance. Yet, neither conferralist nor hierarchical social position theories of 
sexual identity are conducive to the explanation of a central aspect of LGBTQIA+ oppression, viz., 
the closet. 
 
In addition to sexual identity concepts, sexual orientation concepts are important to explaining the 
oppression of the closet; in particular, non-heterosexual individuals are unjustly coerced into 
sexual secrecy. But that’s not the entire normative story. Many closeted individuals are also 
unjustly denied access to queer culture, which – and straight people might be excused for not 
knowing this! – is extremely important to the well-being of many queer individuals. For example, 
here’s Jelani from the House of Mizrahi on the significance of vogue dance, a queer cultural 
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artform with origins in Harlem, NYC: “Voguing is a form of self-expression. It’s like a way for 
gay people to overcome the oppression that they go through on a daily basis – and express it.”22  
 
Jelani has a special right to participate in queer culture. But the fact that Jelani has a special right 
to participate in queer culture isn’t fully explained by facts about Jelani’s sexual dispositions. 
Instead, on my view, Jelani has a special right to participate in queer cultural practices on account 
of facts about Jelani’s sexual identity; indeed, as I’ll discuss in (§4), being queer involves 
participating in cultural practices related to resisting heteronormative ideology.  
 
In sum, conferralist and social position accounts of sexual identity generate the result that closeted 
individuals cannot be queer. Yet, a theory of sexual identity ought to have the conceptual resources 
to express the normative fact that many closeted individuals have a special right to participate in 
queer culture. Here’s motivation for the cultural theory of queer sexual identity, which I’ll outline 
and defend in what follows.  
 
4. The Cultural Theory of Sexual Identity 
 
I endorse the following theory of sexual identity:  
 
Cultural Theory of Queer Sexual Identity: An individual has a queer sexual identity in 
virtue of (i) being excluded from straight culture and (ii) being such that according to the 
constitutive norms of queer culture the individual ought to be included in queer culture. 
 
Cultural Theory of Straight Sexual Identity: An individual has a straight sexual identity in 
virtue of failing to satisfy conditions (i) and/or (ii).23  
 
There’s a lot to be unpacked. To begin, however, note that an individual’s sexual identity is vague 
(at least) to the extent that cultural inclusion and exclusion are vague phenomena. In other words, 
                                                        
22 Vice Media, My House (2018). 
23 An upshot of this view is that queer sexual identity maintains conceptual (and perhaps 
ontological) primacy over straight sexual identity.   
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there’s not always a clean-cut answer to the question of whether an individual is queer or straight. 
This vagueness makes sexual identity no less philosophically significant.24  
 
4.1 Sexuality Cultures 
 
Straight culture is a dominant culture. Queer cultures develop in response to the dominance of 
straight culture. I hope that the distinction between queer and straight cultures is apparent. If not, 
I’d suggest strapping on some boots and heading to the nearest LGBTQIA+ establishment. 
 
In any case, it’ll be useful to describe some characteristic features of queer and straight cultures. 
To get started, I’ll appeal to Sally Haslanger’s work on the metaphysics of culture; in particular, 
Haslanger claims: “culture is a network of social meanings, tools, scripts, schemas, heuristics, 
principles, and the like, which we draw on in action, and which gives shape to our [social] 
practices.”25 And Haslanger explains that social meanings “consist in clusters of culturally shared 
concepts, beliefs, and other attitudes that enable us to interpret and organize information and 
coordinate action, thought, and affect.”26 Social meanings include “informational content” about 
how to evaluate and interact with material objects (ranging from artifacts to bodies), mental states, 
and other persons.27  
 
To gain some traction here, consider how social meanings figure into the practice of cooking.28 
For example, suppose that there are some hibiscus plants growing nearby. Why doesn’t Sage eat 
their edible and nutritious flowers? An informative answer to this question appeals to the social 
meaning of hibiscus flowers. In Sage’s cultural milieu, hibiscus flowers aren’t culturally coded as 
food (with a few exceptions such as teas and specialty cakes). If hibiscus flowers were culturally 
coded as food, Sage would be more likely to eat them. 
                                                        
24 On the metaphysical significance of vague social properties, see Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority 
Body: A Theory of Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 45. 
25 Haslanger, “Culture and Critique” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume XCI (2017), 155. 
26 Haslanger, “What is a (Social) Structural Explanation?,” Philos Stud (2016), 126.   
27 Haslanger, “What is a Social Practice,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (2018), 
239. 
28 Ibid.  
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Crucially, social meanings are linked to social practices, which Haslanger defines as follows: 
“[s]ocial practices are patterns of learned behavior that enable us (in the primary instances) to 
coordinate as members of a group in creating, distributing, managing, maintaining, and eliminating 
a resource (or multiple resources), due to mutual responsiveness to each other’s behavior and the 
resource(s) in question, as interpreted through shared meanings.”29 For example, via social 
meanings, we’ve learned how to engage in social practices that involve “the timing of meals, the 
cuisine, the ways of gathering and preparing to eat, the method of getting food from plate (or bowl, 
or banana leaf) to mouth.”30 Individuals tend to conform to the dominant social practices of their 
milieus, but resistance is possible.31  
 
Queer cultures sustain social meanings and practices, which tend to contrast with analogous 
aspects of straight culture. For example, consider the following queer cultural social meanings of 
the body: for women, unshaven legs are culturally coded as clean; for women, muscular bodies 
(among other forms) are coded as attractive; for men, painted fingernails are culturally coded as 
fashionable. And there are many other queer cultural social meanings. For example, close 
intergenerational friendships and voluntary childlessness are culturally coded as valuable. These 
social meanings, of course, aren’t universal across queer cultures. However, in any particular 
context, queer and straight social meanings tend to be distinct. 
 
Queer cultural social meanings are linked to queer cultural social practices, and queer cultural 
social practices curate (i.e., create, distribute, manage, and maintain) normatively important 
resources. For example, queer cultures curate the resource of sexual wellbeing. On this point, queer 
culture codes various body “types” as attractive in ways that proliferate sexual experience.32 Now, 
                                                        
29 Ibid., 245. Note Haslanger’s technical usage of the concept of resources: “Something becomes 
a resource when its [positive or negative] value, whether economic, aesthetic, moral, prudential, 
spiritual, is recognized […] Social meanings evolve to enable us to perceive, produce, and organize 
the resource,” ibid. 243. 
30 Ibid., 232.  
31 Ibid., 241-243. 
32 For example, see Ron Jackson Suresha, “Bears as Subcultural Subversives: An Interview with 
Eric Rhofes” in Bears on Bears: Interviews and Discussions (New Milford, Connecticut: Bear 
Bones Books, 2018), 13-14. 
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given the ongoing historical exclusion of queer individuals from straight culture (to be discussed 
in the next sub-section), many queer cultural practices relate to sexual well-being. But queer 
culture isn’t all about sex. Queer cultural practices mitigate stigmatization (e.g., via vogue dance), 
preserve important historical and practical knowledge (e.g., via intergenerational friendships), and 
explore gender identity and expression (e.g., via drag performance).  
 
Again, here’s Jelani from the House of Mizrahi: “Realness [an aspect of vogue competition] is 
basically where I just display how I blend in with other heterosexual people […] I just try to be 
real, try to avoid it […] I don’t want to be getting clocked all the time, getting glass bottles thrown 
at me […] You can do that, you real.”33 The ability to pass as straight is often crucial to the safety 
of queer individuals who experience intersectional oppression, e.g., as Black gay men.34 On this 
point, Marlon Bailey explains that vogue dancers “understand that they are seen through a racist 
and homophobic lens propagated and internalized by various sectors of society. Therefore, 
members seek greater agency in shaping how they are viewed by altering and performing their 
bodies in ways that disguise their gender and sexual nonconformity.”35 In this way, vogue dance 
provides an education in passing. Now, that’s a bit of cultural anthropology. Here’s the 
philosophical takeaway: queer cultural practices matter to the well-being of queer individuals.  
 
4.2 Queer Exclusion from Straight Culture  
 
Straight culture can be difficult to notice on account of its pervasiveness. Nonetheless, straight 
culture is organized in accordance with distinctive social meanings and practices. For example, 
consider the following straight cultural social meanings of the body (which tend to contrast with 
analogous queer cultural social meanings): for women, unshaven legs are culturally coded as 
unhygienic; for women, muscular bodies are coded as unattractive; for men, painted fingernails 
are coded as unprofessional. And there are many other straight cultural social meanings. Voluntary 
childlessness, for example, is often stigmatized in straight cultural contexts.  
                                                        
33 Vice Media, My House (2018). 
34 For discussion of the structure of intersectional oppression, see Sara Bernstein, “Intersectional 
Oppression as Proportionate Causation” (manuscript). 
35 Marlon M. Bailey, “Gender/Racial Realness: Theorizing the Gender System in Ballroom 
Culture,” Feminist Studies (2011), 380. 
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Indeed, straight cultural social meanings are paradigmatically linked to straight cultural social 
practices that involve childcare and children. Cheshire Calhoun, for example, theorizes that the 
“displacement” of queer individuals from straight cultural kinship practices is characteristic of 
lesbian and gay oppression; in particular, Calhoun argues: [A]n important aspect of the 
construction of lesbians and gays as outlaws to the family is the idea that lesbians and gay men are 
bad for children,” such that according to heteronormative ideology, lesbians and gay men, “are 
incapable of socializing children into proper gender roles and a heterosexual orientation; they 
cannot be trusted not to molest or seduce the young; and they cannot offer children more than a 
pretended family relationship.36 Along these lines, queer individuals are excluded from straight 
culture.  
 
4.3 Queer Inclusion in Queer Culture 
 
Having a queer sexual identity isn’t only a matter of being excluded from straight culture. Instead, 
I argue that queer sexual identity involves standing in a certain relation to queer culture. That 
relation, however, isn’t the relation of actual inclusion – given that some queer cultures unjustly 
exclude queer individuals from queer culture, e.g., on the basis of transgender gender identity. A 
cultural theory of sexual identity, then, ought to appeal to some counterfactual relation of inclusion. 
And so, I propose that the inclusion relation that matters to queer sexual identity involves the 
inclusion that would obtain if queer cultures abided by their own constitutive norms.  
 
Here’s the idea. A constitutive norm of Go is that the game is played with black and white stones. 
Another constitutive norm is that the game is played on a square grid. On a strict conception, it’s 
impossible to play Go with metal coins. On a somewhat more flexible conception, it’s possible to 
play Go with copper coins, but it’s impossible to play the game on anything but a square grid. 
Different conceptions of the constitutive norms of Go are apt for different purposes. For example, 
a strict conception seems apt for a world championship, but it seems inapt for a casual game among 
friends: “Sure, we played with metal coins, but you still owe me a coffee!” Now, there’s a 
                                                        
36 Cheshire Calhoun, Feminism, The Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay 
Displacement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 160. 
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distinctively constitutive sense of ‘ought’ according to which the game of Go ought to be played 
with black and white stones on a square grid. That’s not a moral decree. It’s an expression of the 
constitutive norms of the game of Go.37  
 
The constitutive norms of Go are social meanings that are linked to the practice of playing the 
game of Go. Similarly, the constitutive norms of queer culture are social meanings that are linked 
to the enactment of queer cultural practices. For example, consider the following constitutive 
norms:  
 
The Norm of Solidarity: If an individual is excluded from straight culture on the basis of 
their sexual orientation, then – according to the norm of solidarity – the individual ought 
to have special access to queer cultural practices that curate normatively important 
resources.  
 
The Norm of Self-Constitution: If the inclusion of an individual in queer culture would 
sustain queer culture against the dominance of straight culture, then – according to the 
norm of self-constitution – the individual ought to have special access to queer cultural 
practices that curate normatively important resources. 
 
According to the norms of solidarity and self-constitution, individuals such as Jelani ought to have 
special access to queer cultural practices such as vogue dance. Inclusion is crucial if queer cultures 
are effectively to resist the dominance of straight culture. 
 
5. Why We Ought to Endorse the Cultural Theory of Sexual Identity 
 
Here, I argue that the cultural theory of sexual identity is especially conducive to explaining 
LGBTQIA+ oppression and resistance. In respective sub-sections, I consider the oppression of the 
                                                        
37 For an account of the linguistic expression of constitutive rules, see Amie Thomasson, “Modal 
Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics,” Philosophical Topics (2007), 138-40. See also 
Haslanger’s account of descriptive normativity, “What is a Social Practice,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement (2018), 237-40. 
 19 
closet, intersectional identity, linguistic directives such as “stop flaunting it,” and the gentrification 
of historic queer neighborhoods.  
 
5.1 The Oppression of the Closet 
 
In (§3.3), I argued that conferralist and hierarchical social position theories of sexual identity 
incorrectly categorize many closeted individuals as straight. Here, I argue that the cultural theory 
of queer sexual identity avoids this result.  
 
On this point, recall Mary, a closeted high school student from Emerald City. Now, for example, 
suppose that operative in Emerald City is a social meaning according to which all and only 
heterosexual individuals ought to wear emerald jewelry. Further suppose that in response to the 
aforementioned social meaning, many out and proud patrons of Emerald City’s gay bar – “The 
Stonewall” – embellish their clothing with amethysts. Yet, Mary wears emeralds. The fact that 
Mary wears emeralds, however, doesn’t amount to Mary being included in straight culture. While 
heterosexual individuals who wear emeralds act in conformity with the dominant social meanings 
of Emerald City, Mary wears emeralds in spite of the aforementioned social meanings.  
 
In short, passing as heterosexual doesn’t amount to inclusion in straight culture. Cultures are, in 
part, constituted by social meanings. And Emerald City’s dominant social meanings hold that Mary 
– along with other non-heterosexual individuals – ought not to wear emeralds. In this way, Mary 
is excluded from straight culture, and the cultural theory of sexual identity generates the correct 
result: Mary is queer. 
 
5.2 Intersectional Identity 
 
Intersectional experience, in some social contexts, incentivizes individuals to highlight certain 
dimensions of their identity while downplaying others. Jovan Bridges speaks to this point with 
respect to Black and gay identities, claiming: “It’s how if I didn’t read as gay before I read as 
black, people would be like, ‘Oh, my God. Let’s cross the street. Let’s lock the door.’ And I made 
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the visual choice to be like, ‘I’m a homosexual.’ I’d rather be flamboyant than a skin color.”38 
Here, Bridges explains an aspect of Black gay intersectional experience in which presenting as gay 
can mitigate – if only to a limited extent – the severe threat of anti-Black racism. The cultural 
analysis of sexual identity is conducive to explaining intersectional experience inasmuch as 
“flamboyant” presentations involve queer cultural practices that amplify exclusion from what 
follows.  
 
5.3 Linguistic Directives 
 
Consider linguistic directives such as “tone it down” and “stop flaunting it.”  For example, Cathy, 
who works in academic administration, explains: “I don’t have to be in the closet. It’s unspoken 
and unwritten – but there’s no flaunting it.”39 The climate of Cathy’s workplace, unfortunately, 
isn’t unique in this respect. For example, Steven claims: “I work out, I work on my truck, I like 
sports […] There were some [gay men that my boss] couldn’t deal with because they were just too 
out there.”40 And here’s Adam Rippon on part of his social experience at the 2018 Winter 
Olympics: “I’ve heard a lot of people say, ‘Adam Rippon should tone it down’.”41  
 
What is Rippon being directed to “tone down”? It seems that Rippon is being targeted on the basis 
of “flamboyant” traits in a cluster of mannerisms, aesthetic presentations, and speech 
characteristics (viz., involving the pronunciations of sibilant consonants). Now, what unifies that 
cluster of traits? I doubt that the traits are unified on account of naturally co-occurring with 
homosexuality, and it’s not (at least, as a complete explanation) that the traits are unified on 
                                                        
38 VH1, Untucked (2019). Importantly, Bridges’ testimony tracks a broader pattern of 
intersectional experience; in particular: “robust evidence [indicates] that people stereotype gay 
men, compared with men whose orientation is unmentioned, in ways that are de-racialized,” 
Christopher D. Petsko and Bodenhausen, Galen V., “Racial Stereotyping of Gay Men: Can a 
Minority Sexual Orientation Erase Race?,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (2019), 51. 
39 Christine L. Williams, Giuffre, Patti A., and Dellinger, Kristen, “The Gay-Friendly Closet” in 
Sexualities: Identities, Behaviors, and Society, eds. Michael Kimmel and The Stony Brook 
Sexualities Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 315.  
40 Ibid., 315. 
41 “Adam Rippon opens up about emotional letters from gay teens,” pinknews.co.uk. 
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account of being gender deviant when exemplified by men.42 Instead, on my view, the cluster of 
traits is culturally unified. The aforementioned mannerisms, aesthetic presentations, and speech 
characteristics are normalized and/or idealized in many queer cultures.  
 
Now, directives such as “tone it down” and “stop flaunting it” might be uttered naïvely. That is, 
individuals who utter “tone it down” might falsely believe that they’re directly targeting 
unprofessional features (as opposed to features related to queer culture). This notwithstanding, it’s 
important not to get lost in discussion about the mental states of individuals who are perpetuating 
injustice and oppression, at least not at the expense of understanding the experiences of 
marginalized individuals.43 In sum, directives such as “tone it down” and “stop flaunting it” 
disincentivize queer individuals from participating in queer culture, and the cultural theory of 
sexual identity provides conceptual resources important to expressing the fact that the 
aforementioned directives wrongfully target individuals on the basis of sexual identity. 
 
5.4 Queer Spaces 
 
Historic queer neighborhoods are disappearing. Indeed, in previous work, I’ve explored various 
normative implications of the following report from Amin Ghaziani: “[u]nique commercial spaces 
such as bars and bookstores are closing, more straight people are moving in [to gayborhoods], and 
gays and lesbians are choosing to live in other parts of the city. Demographers […] have analyzed 
the US census and have confirmed that zip codes associated with traditional gay neighborhoods 
are thinning out.”44 This demographic phenomenon is often portrayed as a regrettable yet 
necessary part of moral progress. But that’s not the right story. Queer spaces are confronted by 
gentrification – driven by “economically motivated straights who have transformed gayborhoods 
                                                        
42 On the latter point, there’s evidence that “GLB speech variants are not imitations of the speech 
patterns of the opposite sex, but are likely to be learned, culturally specific ways of speaking, much 
like other aspects of sociolinguistic variation,” Benjamin Munson and Babel, Molly, “Loose Lips 
and Silver Tongues, or, Projecting Sexual Orientation Through Speech,” Language and Linguistics 
Compass (2007), 443. 
43 On this methodological point, see Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 59. 
44 Amin Ghaziani, Sex Cultures, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017), 40.  
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into ‘visible niche markets for retail commerce and realty speculation’” – that threatens the 
existence of various queer ways of life.45 
 
Historic queer spaces sustain the material conditions required to enact a variety of queer cultural 
practices such as vogue dance that are important to the wellbeing of queer individuals. More 
formally, I hold that the metaphysical fact that an individual has a queer sexual identity partly 
explains the normative fact that that individual (as opposed to their straight counterpart) is 
oppressed by the gentrification of historic queer neighborhoods. Along these lines, the cultural 
theory of sexual identity is conducive to explaining the normative significance of spaces that house 
queer ways of life.  
 
6. Conclusion: LGBTQIA+ Philosophy 
 
This chapter is an early contribution to an exceptionally – and, I’d argue, unjustly – sparse literature 
in LGBTQIA+ philosophy. A central task of the field of LGBTQIA+ philosophy is to theorize 
phenomena that matter to LGBTQIA+ people. With that in mind, I aim to have made some 
progress in understanding what it means to shout, “We’re here! And we’re queer!” 
                                                        
45 Ibid., 47. For additional discussion, see Andler, “The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction,” 
Hypatia (2021), 266-268. 
